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Abstract. Security as a dimension of trustworthiness in IP-Telephony systems
and protocols is a main condition for the commercial success of IP-Telepho-
ny. In this work, we present a survey of security requirements and show how
various standardization efforts address these requirements. We describe the
basic tasks and elements of IP-Telephony systems and compare them to Te-
lephony via PSTNs to derive some possible attacks for example. We classify
the security preconditions to achieve trustworthiness of users and providers
in this systems. We list weighty criteria for further evaluation of security
mechanisms which can fulfil these requirements. After this, we describe the
integration of security mechanisms in current IP-Telephony protocols and
figure out work areas which have to be solved in future.
1  Introduction
Trustworthiness of service users and service providers in applications and systems is a
necessary condition for commercial success of IP-Telephony also called “Voice over
IP” and for the total replacement of Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN) by
IP-Networks for Voice Communication, as it is predicted sometimes.
Trustworthiness in Information Technology Systems generally has different dimen-
sions: correctness, availability and security. In this paper we are focusing on security,
which is concerned about ensuring that a system resists potential attacks that can com-
promise the secrecy, integrity, or availability of data and services. To achieve security
in IP-Networks is more sophisticated than in PSTNs. The risk to be attacked using IP-
Telephony Infrastructure is higher than using PSTNs for a telephone call due of the dif-
ferences of the networks and system architecture: IP-Networks are not centrally man-
aged or controlled. In IP-Telephony voice transmission and signaling is done over the
same IP-Networks. Active elements of an IP-Network, like routers or network-servers,
are, by design, accessible from the network they control. Endpoints of IP-Networks,
personal computers and servers, can be used to attack the network.
Single aspects of IP-Telephony security only are content of related work and IP-Te-
lephony standards most times. The goal of this paper is, to give a complete survey of
the risks of IP-Telephony, the resulting requirements and how they are addressed and
possibly solved in the existing standards. In addition, we list some criteria which should
be noted choosing security mechanisms.
2  IP-Telephony basic Tasks and their Security Requirements
PSTNs and IP Networks exist separately from each other for long days. In the last years
voice and data networks are converging more and more. Three different kinds of con-
vergence can be distinguished:
- Telecommunication Providers use IP-Access to configure and manage the PSTN
components like exchanges or databases storing the operational Information for e.g.
billing or charging.
- The service user request is triggered via an IP-Network, but the service is provided
by the PSTN as transport infrastructure. The PINT-Working Group of the IETF [1]
is concerned with this scenario.
- Voice transfer and signaling is done via one IP-Network. This is called IP-Teleph-
ony or “Voice over IP”.
2.1  IP-Telephony basic Tasks
IP-Telephony should rather be a reengineering of existing PSTN services in the Internet
but to implement new value added services. This is getting more and more important
because the cost reduction argument for investigating in IP-Telephony will not be a
strong argument in future [2]. Nevertheless, IP-Telephony systems and protocols have
to carry out three basic tasks like in the old PSTNs. These basic tasks are the same in
every scenario and have to be done for providing every service:
- Signaling addresses the set up and tear down of calls, including the setup and main-
taining of databases and processors used for call routing and number translation.
- Transmission is the carrying of the audio and / or video data.
- Operation implies the provision, configuration and maintenance of all services
which are used by providers and different users, like location services or charging-
and billing services.
We distinguish these basic tasks in order to reduce the complexity of defining the secu-
rity requirements and the mechanisms possibly used to fulfil these requirements.
2.2  IP-Telephony Infrastructure and Protocols
The current IP-Telephony Infrastructure is based on a decentral organized and managed
architecture. Inside this, some islands e.g. in company networks are administered in a
centralistic structure. The main signaling and operational functions are distributed over
intelligent end systems and network servers in IP-Telephony architectures. In PSTNs,
they are located in central nodes controlled by the providers in contrast. The end sys-
tems are either especially for IP-Telephony build computers, IP-Phones, or normal
computers with software implemented phones like MS-Netmeeting. On the other side,
there are network servers used for maintaining the signaling information and for oper-
ational functions. A common characteristic of these network servers is the decentral set-
up and maintenance.
Currently, two major different protocol families for IP-Telephony exist. The ITU
approach is described in the ITU H.323 umbrella standard [3]. H.323 is supported by
the most existing systems and applications. In contrast, the IETF approach is based on
the Session Initiation Protocol [4] for signaling. It is not in the focus of this paper to ex-
plain the different protocols and system architecture. They are described in detail in
[5,6]. The appearing of network servers like named above is common in both architec-
tures. In H.323 they are called Gatekeeper or Gateways. Proxy Server, Redirect Server,
Registrars and Gateways are satisfying almost the same tasks in the IETF architecture.
2.3  Characteristics of IP-Telephony
The risk to be attacked using IP-Telephony Infrastructure is higher than using PSTNs
for a telephone call due to the differences of underlying networks and system architec-
ture:
- For IP-Telephony signaling, the same IP-Network as for audio transmission is used.
This increases the options for fraud, because a user can maybe forge signaling infor-
mations like IP-addresses or user-IDs.
- IP-Telephony network elements are configured via the IP-Network in contrast to the
PSTN, where the network servers are managed centrally. So, in IP-Telephony, these
elements are accessible for users (and attackers) and have to be secured.
- In IP-Telephony, more functions are located in the decentral end-systems and net-
work servers. This results in a higher effort to administrate these systems in a secure
way and to achieve a high security level, than in an environment, where function is
provided more centralized.
- In IP-Networks, mechanisms, to access data on different nodes of the network and
to use them remote by the users (and possibly attackers) of the network, are availa-
ble in general. Vulnerabilities of IP-Networks and end-systems (operating systems)
are documented and people are more skilled with this. This increases the risk of an
attack.
- Tapping in PSTNs is difficult, since the attacker needs a physical access to the wire
the audio is transmitted. In an IP-Network the attacker only needs physical access
to the network anywhere, when he gets logical access to a router or network server
on the route from endpoint to endpoint.
- Most of the end systems in IP-Telephony are computers, which use and provide gen-
eral network services in addition to telephony specific services. These computers
and services can be attacked and can be used to compromise the entire telephone
system.
In this work we only look at IP-Telephony related risks in depth and not at the risks of
general network services or risk resulting by integration of new IP-Telephony services
in existing IP-Networks.
2.4  Attacks on the basic Services
We show in the following some different workable attacks on the three basic tasks de-
fined above, to clarify the listed risks.
Eavesdropping with a packet sniffer is the simplest attack on the transmission service
in a non switched network. The attacker can listen the conversation. This attack can be
done by everyone who has access to a general network node on the way from end sys-
tem to end system. These can also be IP-Telephony related network servers like proxies
or gateways, whose providers maybe can not be trusted.
Attacks on the signaling service can be used to fraud attacks. The caller ID or called
ID can be changed and the attacker can use services he is not authorized to or without
payment, when the service is with costs, for example. The signaling servers like gate-
keepers or proxies and redirect servers can be attacked also. An invader can change the
entries in the database for instance, so that all calls are rejected or forwarded to his own
voice mail box. This can be done by direct access on the systems, which is not part of
this work, or by sending a forged request to the signaling server. Traffic analysis is an
other kind of attacks. It can be realized by eavesdropping the signaling informations.
Especially service providers may not ignore this problems due of legal regulations.
Attacks on the operational services can result in wrong accounting, no provision-
ing of services an so on. They can be done on the one hand by direct attacks on the sys-
tems, these services are located on, or, on the other hand, by forged configuration or
management commands in the same way.
Additionally, general network attacks, which are not especially IP-Telephony re-
lated, can be used. Such attacks are name server attacks or denial of service attacks for
example.
2.5  Required Security Services
Five different security services are distinguished in principle. We are using the X.800
security services defined in [7] for future use. These are authentication, access control,
confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation. They are necessary for the IP-Telephony
tasks transmission, signaling, operation and other not especially IP-Telephony related
services in principle. We illustrate how these essential services are used for IP-Teleph-
ony, to figure out which services are essential.
Communication security is the part of security, this work is related with. It includes
all security mechanisms which have to be integrated in the IP-Telephony specific pro-
tocol stack for signaling and transmission. Encryption of voice data respectively RTP-
Streams and some signaling information is necessary for confidentiality. Encryption of
voice data protects against some attacks on the transmission service. Authorization of
service users, especially callers, has also to be part of signaling. It protects for misusing
services. Authentication is a elementary requirement. Different kinds of authentication
(end-system to end-system, end-system to network-system, network-system to net-
work-system and hop by hop authentication) are needed. Hop by hop authentication is
necessary, because a call can be forwarded via different domains with not trusted prox-
ies or gatekeepers. End-system to network-system authentication is used, when an end-
system registers at a network-system. Caller ID, Called ID and “who we thought we are
calling”-ID are the informations that have to be authenticated at least. Authentication
protects from many attacks on signaling and operational services.
It is not possible to describe all security requirements in detail in this work. In ad-
dition to the above categories, the following table shows an executive summary of the
requirements, whereby the essential requirements are marked in grey.
Key management is not a fundamental security requirement, but it is necessary for
many cryptographic security mechanisms, used to ensure the other requirements. So, it
is part of the table, though it is not clear, whether it is part of the IP-Telephony specific
signaling itself or part of an external key exchange protocol.
Other security aspects has to be observed by manufactures and system administra-
tors, using IP-Telephony solutions in addition to the communication security. We men-
tion it in this work, because it is also essential form a security view.
Systems security covers well known requirements. Many manufacturers are devel-
oping new end systems like IP-Phones and network servers like Gatekeepers and Gate-
ways. They can be combined with existing PBXs mostly. They are integrated in the cor-
porate IP-Network on the other hand, since they are specialized computers in a distrib-
uted heterogeneous environment. The same security requirements have to be achieved
for these systems like for existing computer systems and applications. Our observations
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from a big field trial [8] are, that many systems unfortunately do not meet the require-
ments. We will present our results after the vendors had time to fix the problems in de-
tail.
The support of additional telephony services in an IP-Network should not result in
new security risks for the environment, the IP-Telephony systems are integrated in. This
can not be guaranteed in any case, because many existing security mechanisms are not
designed for supporting IP-Telephony communication. The access from and to a corpo-
rate IP network is controlled via a firewall for example. Firewalls do often network ad-
dress translation in addition. Both, existing firewall mechanisms like packet filters or
proxies and network address translation, represent a problem for IP-Telephony proto-
cols vice versa. This problem is described in [9] in detail. To enable IP-Telephony over
existing firewalls, the security level has to be reduced in many cases. Therefore, new
approaches for firewall architectures, as described in [10], or the support of firewalls by
the IP-Telephony protocols, are necessary. The IETF SIP Working Group has ad-
dressed this problem as open task. First starting points are described in [11,12].
Laws and regulations have to be observed at the end. This leads to new require-
ments which are sometimes contradictionary to users requirements. For example lawful
interception is a must in many cases.
2.6  Evaluation Criteria for Security Mechanisms
Many cryptographic mechanisms do exist. They are solving most requirements in prin-
ciple, but not every solution can be used in every scenario. At this point, we list different
criteria to evaluate the different mechanisms:
- Quality of service is a major concern for realtime IP-Telephony services. It must
match or exceed that of PSTNs [13]. Different measures should be considered.
The call setup delay is one significant aspect. The integration of cryptographic
mechanisms can result in a bigger delay, especially if public-key mechanisms are
used. The work overhead per sending and receiving packet for encryption and de-
cryption is an other criteria. Asymmetric encryption of the coded audio data can not
be done in realtime by simple end-systems. The bandwidth overhead, incurred by
inflating the data packets via cryptographic transformations, should also be consid-
ered from the communication network point of view.
- Scalability is the second major concern. For commercial use, the implemented
mechanisms have to work in large environments and not only in a testbed. Scalabil-
ity can be observed on the different levels. The verification of a certificate or the
number of different domains are examples.
- A precondition for choosing mechanisms is the general availability and operation-
ality of the infrastructure, used by the cryptographic mechanisms inside the IP-Te-
lephony protocols. Per-user public keys and the integration of Certification Author-
ities in the architecture are necessary for using public key mechanisms for example.
An other example is the broad implementation of IPSec if it should be used.
- Reliability of security mechanisms is a further criteria. No single point of failure
may exist.
- The grade of security the mechanisms provide is an other criteria. A reasonable
grade has to be choosen. But, it is difficult to quantify the degree of security. For
algorithms for example it depends on how hard they are to break [14].
The evaluation of security mechanisms is a difficult tasks, because all aspects do not
have to be considered isolated. It is only necessary to address this task for the purpose
of this paper.
3  Security Mechanisms in IP-Telephony Standards
Security mechanisms have to be part of the IP-Telephony standards due to meet the
mentioned requirements and to achieve compatibility and operability between different
IP-Telephony systems. We will describe where security is part of the standards and
show where the requirements are realized in the following section. Our focus is on the
main security requirements marked in Table 1.
3.1  Transmission Services
Confidentiality of the media streams is the primary requirement for transmission serv-
ices. RTP [15] and RTCP are the underlying protocols used for transmission services in
both IETF and ITU architecture. To realize confidentiality, the data streams have to be
encrypted. This can be done after coding and segmenting the data by the sender. The
encrypted segments can be sent as RTP data units and decrypted by the receiver. The
RTP-Headers are not encrypted. The use of symmetric encryption is necessary, due to
the bad performance of asymmetric encryption. The ITU suggests the encryption of the
media streams in this way in H.235 [16]. The encryption capabilities of the systems can
be negotiated during signaling. DES, Triple DES and RC2 are intended as encryption
algorithms. SIP covers only the signaling, but the encryption of the media streams is
possible in the same way. RTCP security is not done so far.
The use of symmetric encryption results in the necessity, to exchange session keys
between the partners. The key management is not part of the transmission service (RTP)
itself. It is part of the H.245 signaling in the ITU world and not defined in SIP. So the
key management has to be part of the SIP message body.
3.2  Signaling Services
Authentication, confidentiality and in addition key management are the two major se-
curity requirements for signaling. The realisation of this security services differs in the
two approaches.
ITU H.235. Recommendation H.235 retains the security aspects within the H.323 pro-
tocol family. Authentication and call authorization is necessaryly done during call es-
tablishment and sometimes before the call is accepted. TLS [17] or IPSec [18] on trans-
port or network layer are the only possibilities to realize this. Authentication of users is
supported during call control. It is done either during the initial call connection in the
process of securing the signaling-channel (H.245) by support of challenge response
mechanisms or by exchanging certificates on the H.245 channel. H.245 [19] supports
the negotiation of the necessary parameters. Hop by hop authentication is provided by
using this mechanisms only. End to end authentication is not provided.
In H.235 two security profiles are defined. The simple security profile and the sig-
nature profile. Both profiles do not cover the confidentiality of the signaling informa-
tion, except using TLS or IPSec. The key management is part of the profiles. The ex-
change of certificates and a Diffie Hellmann key exchange are supported. But the key
management only covers the exchange of certificates, not the criteria by which they are
mutually verified and accepted.
SIP. Security support is inside the SIP protocol. There is a hard discussion about which
problems should be solved in the Working Group actually. From this, we can only de-
scribe the existing RFC.
SIP requests may be authenticated using the Authorization header field to include a
digital signature of certain header fields, the request method and version number and
the payload. For authentication PGP or HTTP authentication are intended. Not all head-
er fields can be authenticated, because they have to be changed possibly by proxies. So,
end to end authentication is not achieved completely. On the other hand, hop-by-hop
authentication can be provided. It is not specified which mechanism should be used on
the underlying layers. IPSec and TLS are discussed.
SIP supports three complementary forms of encryption to protect confidentiality.
End-to-end encryption of the SIP message body and certain sensitive header fields; hop-
by-hop encryption to prevent eavesdropping that tracks who is calling whom; hop-by-
hop encryption of Via fields to hide the route a request has taken. Not all header fields
can be encrypted because they are used for call routing. Additionally SIP requests and
responses may also be protected by security mechanisms at the transport or network
layer, maybe IPSec or TLS. The specification of using a particular mechanism is not
part of SIP signaling. It has to be specified outside of the signaling.
3.3  Operational Services
Many different protocols have to be surveyed for securing operational services. The se-
curity requirements are strongly related to systems security most times, if the services
are maintained and configured by closed groups, e.g. by the providers of the services.
This is in contrast to the management of signaling information. In this case, well known
mechanisms for authentication and authorization can be used. Due to this characteristic,
we will not focus the operational aspects so far.
3.4  Summary
The major security requirements are covered in the standardization efforts, as shown in
Table 2. Many additional requirements, like non repudiation, are not performed. Even-
tually, this prevents the evaluation of new commercial services. An other disadvantage
is the use of mechanisms which are not spreaded, like IPSec or the use of public key
certificates. We do not believe, that every user of an IP-Phone holds a public key cer-
tificate. Also, some other criteria we defined, are not accomplished. The verification of
certificates during call establishment grows up the setup delay. Also, such mechanisms
maybe do not scale in large environments. The evaluation of the mechanisms in detail
by using the criteria listed above, is for future work.
4  Conclusion and future work
IP-Telephony Security was given less or no attention in recent years. Nowadays, when
IP-Telephony becomes a commercial available service and many vendors implement
systems, it is necessary to support security mechanisms by the protocols and to build
secure systems and applications. This demand is recognized by the standardization bod-
ies during the last months. ETSI-TIPHON has founded a new working group “TIPHON
Security” at End of 1999 [20]. The IETF-SIP Working Group has consensus to make
security a WG effort. An informal design team has the goal, to clarify the SIP specifi-
cation with respect to security and to describe practices and mechanisms for interaction
Table 2: Security support in the IP-Telephony protocols
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with other security systems. The discussion started at the 47th IETF meeting in March
2000 [21].
Much work has to be done, we think. Especially, many security mechanisms, which
are discussed in the different groups, like IPSec, are not in widespread use. Additional-
ly, it is insufficient to define the standards, they have to be implemented. No commer-
cial implementation, supporting confidentiality of transmission, exists to our knowl-
edge. It is useful to point out the security aspects. Therefore, we give a review of the
different requirements, evaluation criteria and standardization efforts in this paper. Our
main focus of future work will be on integration of authentication mechanisms in sign-
aling protocols, systems vulnerability and firewall mechanisms for multimedia commu-
nication in general.
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